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THE UNIFORM RELOCATION ACT: ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR RELOCATION
BENEFITS-YOUNG V. HARRIS
Federal urban renewal programs, now terminated, have uprooted
millions of people in unsuccessful efforts to eliminate urban blight.'
I Title I of the 1949 Housing Act, introducing the federal urban renewal pro-
gram. represents the first major piece of congressional legislation enacted for the pur-
pose of engaging the community, private businesses, and the federal government in a
cooperative effort to prevent the spread of urban blight. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L.
No. 81-171, tit. I, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1492
(1976)). See C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 504-05 (4th ed.
1972); M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN
RENEWAL 4 (1964); P. SCHORR, PLANNED RELOCATION 71-75 (1975). Under the pro-
gram. a local public agency carrying out a federally aided urban redevelopment pro-
ject would acquire real property in the designated area from willing land owners by
purchase and from unwilling land owners by the power of eminent domain. See M.
ANDERSON, supra, at 4. P. SCHORR, supra, at 71-75.
Uprooted residents challenged the constitutionality of the federal urban renewal
program, primarily on the ground that it violated private property rights. The
Supreme Court, however, declared the program constitutional. In Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), the court effectively held that eminent domain, previously used
only to acquire private property for public purposes, could now be used to acquire
private property from individuals in furtherance of an urban renewal program and
then sold to other persons for their private uses. Id. at 33-34. See M. ANDERSON,
supra, at 183-93.
Forcibly displaced residents continued to criticize the federal urban renewal pro-
gram on other grounds. First, since 1949 urban improvement programs displaced
nearly a quarter of a million people each year. Approximately two-thirds of the peo-
ple forced out of their homes were black, Puerto Rican, or members of some other
mmority group. Many of the minority residents were also poor or elderly or both.
See Uniform Relocation .4ssistance and LandAcquisitions Policies-1970 Hearings on
H.R. 14898. H.R. 14899, SI. and Related Bills Before the House Comm. on Public
Works, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 458-60 (1969-1970) (statement of Kenneth Phillips)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELA-
TIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES DISPLACED
BY GOVERNMENTS 34-39 (1965); M. ANDERSON, supra, at 7-8; P. SCHORR, supra, at
75-78. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N NAT'L INST., UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSIST-
ANCE AND LAND ACQUISITION POLICIES PROCEEDINGS 58-115 (1971).
Second, urban renewal programs typically shifted poor residents from one substan-
dard home to another. Thus, the actual number of blighted areas increased rather
than decreased because these residents created pockets of urban blight in other areas.
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With the enactment of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970 (Uniform Relocation
Act),2 Congress responded to growing concern over the lack of uni-
formity in compensation and assistance to persons displaced by real
property acquisitions in federal and federally-assisted programs. 3 Al-
though the Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict over some eli-
gibility requirements for relocation benefits under the Uniform Act,4
the holding did not encompass all aspects of eligibility.5 In Young v.
See S. GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES 55-64 (1965); E. MAY, THE
WASTED AMERICANS 103-43 (1964).
Third, there was a short supply of replacement housing, therefore, many persons
were displaced with no place to relocate. This problem was especially severe for
black or large families as well as for the elderly. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON IN-
TERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra, at 26-38.
Finally, many of the forcibly displaced residents suffered severe hardships and
financial losses while other displaced persons were overcompensated. Differential
treatment of persons adversely affected by real property acquisitions for urban re-
newal and other federally assisted programs created a growing number of complaints.
See House Hearings, supra, at 1 (statement of James R. Grover); ADVISORY CONIM'N
ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra, at 26-38.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
3. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of James J. Howard). See
also ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 4-6.
4. Alexander v. HUD, 441 U.S. 39, 47-49 (1979) (relocation benefits not available
to displaced tenants who receive written notice to vacate premises where such orders
were not motivated by a government acquisition of real property for a public pur-
pose).
5. The Supreme Court construed the written order clause of § 101(6) of the Uni-
form Relocation Act. Relocation benefits are available under the Act for persons who
satisfy either the "written order" or "acquisition" clause of this definition. See note
31 and accompanying text infra for a complete reading of§ 101(6). The written order
clause covers the class of persons who move, upon written notice, in anticipation of
the acquisition of their property for a federal program. See Alexander v. HUD, 441
U.S. at 46-49.
Since the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and District of Columbia Cir-
cuit adopted conflicting interpretations of the written order clause, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Id. at 39. In the Seventh Circuit the court held that § 101(6) ap-
plied the written order clause only to displacement programs designed to benefit the
public as a whole, not dislocation as a result of federal demolition proceedings. Thus,
tenants, ordered to vacate so that demolition plans could proceed, were not "dis-
placed persons" as defined under the written order clause of § 101(6). See Blades v.
HUD, 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977).
The District of Columbia Circuit held, conversely, that the written order clause was
applicable to displacement programs designed to benefit the public as a whole, and
that a federal demolition plan was such a program. Thus, tenants who move upon
written notice of demolition plans were "displaced persons" under the written order
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Harris,6 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals strictly construed other
eligibility requirements by holding that evicted residents of an urban
redevelopment area were not eligible for benefits as "displaced per-
sons" under the Act since a government agency or an agency receiv-
ing federal financial assistance did not force them to move.7
The City of St. Louis declared an area blighted and designated it
for redevelopment by a Chapter 353 urban redevelopment corpora-
tion.' As a corporate incentive to aid the municipality in eliminating
urban decay, the city offered the corporation powers of eminent do-
clause of § 101(6) entitled to receive relocation benefits. See Cole v. Hills, 571 F.2d
590 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court, affirming the Seventh Circuit's decision, held that the written
order clause encompasses only those persons ordered to vacate in connection with the
actual or proposed acquisitions of property for a federal program. Alexander v.
HUD, 441 U.S. at 46-48. The Court necessarily limited the clause's application and it
does not extend to the range of requirements for acquiring property or benefits under
the Uniform Relocation Act.
6. 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
7. Id. at 877-78. The written order clause under § 101(6) of the Uniform Reloca-
tion Act was not at issue in the present case. Appellants in Young did not question
the issuance of legal notice to vacate, but were complaining about the "extralegal"
procedures of constructive eviction through the termination of vital building services.
Constructive eviction occurs when a tenant's possession is interrupted by material
impairment of his beneficial enjoyment of premises so that he is compelled to vacate.
Brief for Appellants at 14-15, Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Appellants Brief].
The Eighth Circuit adopted the plain meaning rule in interpreting the Act's re-
maining eligibility clauses for relocation benefits. 599 F.2d at 877-78. The plain
meaning rule is a rule of statutory construction that requires a strict or narrow inter-
pretation of statutory language to determine the statute's applicability to a given set of
facts. Consequently, whenever the plain meaning rule is adopted, the likelihood that
the statute will apply is reduced. See Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline
of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 338-45 (1976); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die:
The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1304-05 (1975). See generally Jones, The Plain
Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation ofFederal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.
L. Q. 2 (1939). Had the Eighth Circuit in Young not adopted the plain meaning rule,
as the appellants hoped, the outcome of the case may have been different.
8. Recognizing deteriorating conditions in the "Pershing-Waterman" area in
1971, the city declared the 106-acre area to be "blighted" and designated it for rede-
velopment. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 873 (8th Cir. 1979). Missouri's Urban
Redevelopment Corporations Laws defines "blighted area" as:
that portion of the city within which the legislative authority of such city deter-
mines that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or
physical deterioration, have become economic and social liabilities, and that such
conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability
to pay reasonable taxes.
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main together with tax abatements.9 The city then applied for and
Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (1978).
Missouri law provides two means of establishing redevelopment projects by private
entities. First, under the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority Law, an au-
thority or commission having municipal powers may acquire land in an area for
which it has development plans and then sell or lease the land to a private enterprise
for redevelopment. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 99.010 to .715 (1978). Second, under the Ur-
ban Redevelopment Corporations Law, private redevelopment corporations initiate
plans for redevelopment subject to the approval and authority of the appropriate leg-
islative or administrative agency. The redeveloper then acquires the land by condem-
nation or purchase. Id. §§ 353.010 to .180 (1978).
Both the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law, id. §§ 99.010 to .715 and the
Urban Redevelopment Corporations Law, id. §§ 353.010 to .180 were enacted pursu-
ant to the authority of Article VI of the Missouri Constitution. Mo. CONST. art. VI,
§ 21. The Missouri courts have declared both laws constitutional. See, e.g., Annbar
Ass'n v. West Side Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Mo. 1966) (declared Urban
Redevelopment Corporations Law constitutional); Land Clearance for Redev. Auth.
of St. Louis v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 974, 976, 270 S.W.2d 44, 64 (1954) (Land
Clearance for Redevelopment Law is constitutional).
In Young, the City of St. Louis employed the latter means of redevelopment. 599
F.2d at 873. A Missouri urban redevelopment corporation is defined as:
a corporation organized under the provisions of this chapter, provided, however,
that any life insurance company organized under the laws of, or admitted to do
business in, the state of Missouri may from time to time within five years after
the effective date of this law, undertake, alone or in conjunction with, or as a
lessee or any such life insurance company or urban redevelopment corporation, a
redevelopment project under this chapter, and shall, in its operations with respect
to any such redevelopment project, but not otherwise, be deemed to be an urban
redevelopment corporation for the purpose of this [and other sections].
Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(10) (1978).
9. Chapter 353 urban redevelopment corporations are granted special privileges
such as the power of eminent domain. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.130 (1978). See note 64
and accompanying text infra on the doctrine of eminent domain. Other privileges
include the authority to employ several agencies to cooperate in land assemblage and
acquisition. St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 57,217(b) (June 22, 1976). These corporations
receive major tax abatements. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.110 (1978). All privileges are
subject to the corporation's declared purpose of promoting public health, safety, and
welfare. Net earnings derived from development projects, however, can never exceed
the sum of 8% per year. Id. § 353.030(11)(1978).
Although Chapter 353 corporations have many public features, they are, by law,
organized and administered like any other private corporation. Articles of agreement
must be prepared and filed with the Secretary of State containing, among other items,
the amount of corporate capital stock, the number of shares and directors, and the
location of the corporation's principal place of business. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.030
(1978). These corporations may buy and sell property, borrow money, and issue se-
curities. Id. §§ 353.130 to .150 (1978). For a thorough discussion on the Missouri
Chapter 353 program, see D. MANDELKER, G. FEDER & M. COLLINS, REVIVING CIT-
IES WITH TAX ABATEMENT (1980) [hereinafter cited as REVIVING CITIES].
In Young, the urban redevelopment corporation received federal mortgage insur-
ance from HUD. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 1979). This type of
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received federal financial assistance for redevelopment of the area,
but none of these funds were used for real property acquisitions.' °
federal aid, however, is not considered federal financial assistance as defined under
§ 101(4) of the Uniform Act because federal mortgage insurance was specifically ex-
cluded from the definition of federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(4) (1976).
Since the redevelopment corporation did not receive federal financial assistance, is
was not required to make relocation payments to persons displaced by urban redevel-
opment. See notes 66 and 84 and accompanying text infra.
The city purportedly adopted the redevelopment plans of the Pershing Redevelop-
ment Corporation pursuant to the city code. ST. Louis, Mo., REV. CODE §§ 29.010 to
.390 (1979); Brief for Appellees Pantheon Corp. and Pershing Redev. Corp. at 3-9,
Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979). City approval of Chapter 353 redevel-
opment plans and the accompanying grant of eminent domain power are void if the
stringent procedural requirements of Chapter 29 are not satisfied. Unfortunately, the
issue of whether the Pershing-Waterman redevelopment plan conformed with the nu-
merous detailed requirements set out in Chapter 29 was not raised on appeal. It is
highly unlikely that the plan met the requirements. See note 14 and accompanying
text infra.
Chapter 29 expressly requires, among other items, that the plan for redevelopment
contain a detailed statement providing for the relocation of those families displaced
by the redevelopment project and a proposed method of financing. Consequently,
Chapter 353 corporations have consistently failed to comply with all of the required
procedures. The primary reason for Chapter 353 corporations' noncompliance is that
neither the city nor the courts have strictly enforced the code in the past. Recently,
however, courts have construed and enforced Chapter 29 to the detriment of the
redeveloper and to the benefit of potentially displaced persons. See e.g., Maryland
Plaza Corp. v. Greenberg, Nos. 40697 & 40846 at 7 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 1979)
(redeveloper's financing plan so desolate of any detail required by Chapter 29 so as to
be completely inadequate); Schweig v. City of St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215, 226 (1978)
(plaintiffs' claim that city approved a redevelopment plan which contained no state-
ment of financing was contrary to provisions of Chapter 29 and stated a cause of
action).
10. The city received a federal community block grant from HUD. Young v.
Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 878 (8th Cir. 1979). Congress authorized the Community Block
Grant program to consolidate and finance all activities previously eligible under sepa-
rate categorical community development programs. Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). These programs, some
of which date back to 1949, include urban renewal and neighborhood development
programs; historic preservation, urban beautification and open space land programs;
the model cities program- and water and sewer facilities and neighborhood facilities
programs. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM 15 (3d ann. rep. 1978).
The city's 1978 application for federal financial assistance was, in part, a request for
continued support for the Pershing-Waterman area redevelopment. Young v. Harris,
599 F.2d at 875. This was a grant of federal financial assistance within the meaning of
the Uniform Relocation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(4) (1976). Nevertheless, this grant did
not trigger the Uniform Act because the city was not the agency actually acquiring the
real property. 599 F.2d at 876-77. Under the Act, the agency acquiring real property
must be the agency receiving federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976).
See note 66 infra.
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The redevelopment forced area residents out of their residences"I and
denied them relocation benefits because they did not qualify as "dis-
placed persons" under the Uniform Relocation Act.
2
Resident representatives, who had been forced to move from the
redevelopment area, 3 initiated action in federal district court claim-
ing they were "displaced persons" as defined in the Uniform Act and
entitled to receive relocation assistance.' 4 The appellate court af-
firmed the district court's denial of the residents' motion for a prelim-
inary injunction restraining the private corporation from continuing
redevelopment activities. 5 The court held that the definition of "dis-
placed persons" did not encompass persons dislocated by programs
undertaken by private agencies not receiving federal financial assist-
ance.
16
The idea of relocation as a formal, ongoing process subject to fed-
eral control evolved from the United States Housing Act of 1949.1'
11. The $75 million, 1,500 unit redevelopment project undertaken by the Pershing
Redevelopment Corporation displaced more than 1,000 residents from the Pershing-
Waterman area. The Pershing Redevelopment Corporation is a subsiduary of Pan-
theon Corporation. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 6, 1979, at 3A, col. 3 [hereinafter
cited as Post-Dispatch]. See generally Appellants Brief, note 7 at 13-15 supra.
12. The court adopted the position of HUD, the urban redevelopment corpora-
tion, and the city and denied relief to residents of the redevelopment area. It ruled the
residents were not "displaced persons" within the technical meaning of§ 101(6) of the
Uniform Relocation Act. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 877.
13. Appellants were predominately black, lower-income residents or former resi-
dents of the Pershing-Waterman redevelopment area. 599 F.2d at 872; Post-Dispatch,
supra note 11, at col. 5.
14. Appellants alleged violations of the Housing and Community Development
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5319 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) and the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). Both of these alleged violations are be-
yond the scope of this Comment.
Residents' initial complaint also alleged violations of the federal Civil Rights Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977), the Missouri Relocation Assistance
Act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 523.200 to .215 (1978), and selected city ordinances, St. Louis,
Mo., Ordinances, 56125 (March 20, 1972), 56126 (Apr. 5, 1972), 56127 (Apr. 5, 1972),
and 57217 (June 22, 1976). None of these arguments was raised on appeal. Young v.
Harris, 599 F.2d at 873.
15. 599 F.2d at 879.
16. Id. at 877. Appellants will apply for certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court. Interview with Margaret Morrison, Attorney for Appellants (Sept.
19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Morrison Interview].
17. The Housing Act of 1949 and its subsequent amendments provided limited
relocation payments to persons forcibly displaced as a result of federal urban renewal
programs. See notes I supra and 22 infra for a discussion of the legislative history of
the relocation benefit provisions of the Housing Act.
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Early relocation assistance, however, lacked uniformity and ade-
quacy,' 8 resulting in severe hardship for the elderly, 9 the poor,20 and
minorities2 who suffered disproportionately as a result of urban im-
provement programs. During the social revolution of the 1960s,
which heightened awareness of the housing and human needs of
slum residents, urban renewal22 and highway programs 23 showed
18. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at I (statement of James R. Grover); ADVI-
SORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 26-28.
19. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 458-60 (statement of Kenneth Phillips);
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 26-39; M. ANDER-
SON, supra note 1, at 7-8; P. SCHORR, supra note 1, at 75-78.
20. See S. GREER, supra note 1, at 55-64; E. MAY, supra note 1, at 130-43.
21. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 458-60 (statement of Kenneth Phillips);
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 26-39; M. ANDER-
SON, supra note 1, at 7-8; P. SCHORR, supra note 1, at 75-78.
22. Urban renewal was the first public program which clearly caused major dis-
placement. See Hartman, Relocation.- Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L.
REV. 745, 747 (1971). Prior to the 1960s, the federal government restricted demolition
in residential areas and provided temporary relocation benefits in the event that such
demolition could not be avoided. The Housing Act provided:
There be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced
from the project area, and that there are or are being provided, in the project area
or in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and
public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means
of the families displaced from the project area, decent, safe, and sanitary dwell-
ings equal in number to the number of and available to such displaced families
and reasonably accessible to their places of employment: Provided, That in view
of the existing acute housing shortage, each such contract entered into prior to
July 1, 1951, shall further provide that there shall be no demolition of residential
structures in connection with the project assisted under the contract prior to July
1, 195 1, if the local governing body determines that the demolition thereof would
reasonably be expected to create undue housing hardship in the locality.
Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, § 105(c), 63 Stat. 417 (1949) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977)).
In 1959 Congress amended the Housing Act of 1949 to provide relocation payments
by public agencies to persons displaced from urban renewal areas. The amendment
expanded the previous temporary relocation payment provision which was limited to
$100 in the case of family or $2,500 for business concerns. Housing Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-372, § 409(a)(I), 73 Stat. 673 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1456(f) (1949)). The
1959 amendment provided that
the term 'relocation payments' means payments by a local public agency to indi-
viduals, families, and business concerns for their reasonable and necessary mov-
ing expenses and any actual direct losses of property except goodwill or
profit. . .resulting from their displacement from an urban renewal area made
necessary by (i) the acquisition of real property by a local public agency or by
any other public body, (ii) code enforcement activities undertaken in connection
with an urban renewal project, or (iii) a program of voluntary rehabilitation of
buildings or other improvements in accordance with an urban renewal plan: Pro-
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some progress toward providing economic equity to displaced per-
sons. This awareness also culminated in the passage of the landmark
Uniform Relocation Act in 1970.24 The Act's purpose is to eliminate
differential treatment of persons adversely affected by real property
acquisitions for public purposes.2 5
Before the federal government enacted the Uniform Relocation
Act, Congress passed only piecemeal legislation regarding relocation
benefits.26 Earlier legislation provided compensation for relocation
expenses to those persons displaced as a result of selected federal pro-
grams.27 The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Act illustrates this
vided, That such payments shall not be made after completion of the project or if
completion is deferred solely for the purpose of obtaining further relocation pay-
ments.
Id.
In 1964 Congress allowed additional payments to small businesses, individuals, and
families with excessive relocation costs. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560,
§ 113, 78 Stat. 790 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1456 (1959)). This amendment effectively
tightened requirements for relocation assistance and expanded provisions for pay-
ment of relocation benefits. H.R. REP. No. 1703, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3417. Congress' rationale for expanding the
relocation payment provision was that assisting and compensating displaced persons
for the hardship of relocating is a legitimate cost of urban renewal. Id. at 3431.
23. The federal highway program generates urban relocation of some magnitude
accounting for over one-third of all displacements. See Note, Relocation: An Investi-
gation into Relocation under the Federal-Aid Highway Program, 7 COL. J. OF L. &
Soc. PROB. 466, 467 (1971); U. S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., DISPLACE-
MENT REPORT 74 (1979).
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 authorized states to make limited payments
for relocation expenses. Pub. L. No. 87-866 § 5(a), 76 Stat. 1146 (1962) (current ver-
sion at 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-156 (1976)). Federal highway trust funds, previously re-
stricted to property acquisitions and road construction, were made available by
Congress for relocation assistance. Because the federal law merely authorized and
did not require that relocation assistance be provided, many displaced residents were
without assistance. See P. SCHORR, supra note 1, at 78-79.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976). For a general background on major provi-
sions of relocation legislation that preceeded passage of the Uniform Relocation Act,
see Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745, 747
(1971).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58, as
amended by ch. 836, 49 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1935); Act to Authorize Certain Construc-
tion of Military and Naval Installations, ch. 434, § 501(b), 65 Stat. 364 (1951). See
generaly Alexander v. HUD, 411 U.S. 39 (1979); ADVIS6RY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T
RELATIONS, supra, note 1, at 82-85.
27. See note 26 supra.
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point.28 After the Depression, Congress authorized the Secretary of
the Army and the Secretary of the Interior to make relocation pay-
ments to persons forcibly displaced by TVA land acquisitions.29
Section 101(6) of the Uniform Relocation Act defines those persons
entitled to relocation benefits by designating which dislocated per-
sons are eligible for relocation assistance.30 To be a "displaced per-
son," one must show dislocation as a result of acquisitions of real
property for a public purpose by a federal agency or by a state agency
receiving federal financial assistance.3
The decision in Young is consistent with case law32 and the Act's
legislative history.33 Courts have held the Uniform Relocation Act
28. 16 U.S.C. § 83 1(q) (1976). To obtain the site known as Cove Creek Dam and
the water nghts to the reservoir above the dam, Congress authorized the government
to enter into contractual agreements with railroads, railroad corporations, common
carriers, and all other public utility commissions and any other persons, firm, or cor-
poration, for the relocation of railroad tracts, highways, highway bridges, mills, fer-
ner, electric-light plants, and any and all other properties, enterprises, and projects
whose removal may be necessary m order to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
.d. It is unclear whether this statute provided relocation benefits to natural persons
because all the potential beneficiaries named in the statute are public utilities, corpo-
rations, and other legally defined persons. Apparently, Congress could have provided
relocation benefits to natural persons since the ambiguity of the statute can withstand
such a liberal construction. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS,
supra note 1. In any event, no cases have construed the statute and the government
has completed the Cove Creek Dam project.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 831(q) (1976).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976).
31. Section 101(6) provides in its entirety:
The term "displaced person" means any person who, on or after the effective
date of this Act, moves from real property, or moves his personal property from
real property, as a result of the acquisition of such real property, in whole or in
part, or as a result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real
property for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with
Federal financial assistance; and solely for the purpose of sections 202(a) and (b)
and 205 of this title, as a result of the acquisition of or the result of the written
order of the acquiring agency to vacate other real property, on which such person
conducts a business or farm operation, for such program or project.
Id.
The definition of "displaced person" governs basic eligibility for a variety of bene-
fits under the Uniform Relocation Act. These benefits include limited compensation
for reasonable moving expenses, id. § 4622; replacement housing for homeowners and
limited replacement housing payments, id. § 4623; replacement housing for tenants
and others, id. § 4624; and relocation assistance advisory services, id. § 4625.
32. See notes 34-45 and accompanying text infra.
33. The legislative history of both the Uniform Relocation Act generally and the
section specifically governing the eligibility requirements for relocation benefits shows
1980]
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only applies when all conditions of the "displaced person" test have
been met. Thus, dislocation resulting from orders to vacate or acqui-
sitions of private property for a private purpose by a federal or state
agency receiving federal financial assistance is outside the Act's
scope. Consequently, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. HUD3 4 de-
nied relocation benefits to dislocated tenants who received written or-
ders to vacate because such orders were not motivated by a
government acquisition of real property for a public purpose.3 5
Likewise, dislocation as a result of acquisitions of real property for
a public purpose by a federal or state agency not receiving federal
financial assistance is not within the scope of the Act. Thus, in Felici-
ano v. Romney,36 indigent families were denied relocation benefits
under the Uniform Relocation Act because they were dislocated by
the city's acquisition before the city entered into a contract with the
federal government for federal financial assistance. 7
Similarly, the Act does not encompass dislocation as a result of
acquisitions for a public purpose by a private agency receiving fed-
eral aid in any form other than as required by the Act. Conse-
quently, in Conway v. Harris38 tenants dislocated as a result of
that Congress intended to limit the number of persons eligible to receive relocation
benefits. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 7
(prior to the Uniform Relocation Act, Congress passed only piecemeal legislation
providing limited relocation benefits to persons displaced as a result of particular fed-
eral programs and courts strictly construed the concept ofjust compensation such that
displaced persons were most often denied relocation benefits); HousE SELECT SUB-
COMM. ON REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION, 88TH CONG., 2D Sass., STUDY OF COM-
PENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY
ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 19-26 (Comm.
Print 1964); Alexander v. HUD, 411 U.S. 39 (1979).
The Fair Compensation Act is the basis for many of the provisions ultimately codi-
fied in § 101(6) of the Uniform Relocation Act. HousE SELECT SUBCOMM. ON REAL
PROPERTY ACQUISITION 145-67. It was proposed in 1964 to provide fair and equita-
ble treatment on a basis as nearly uniform as practicable for those persons adversely
affected by acquisitions of real property in federal and federally assisted programs.
Congress never enacted this proposal. Congress' replacement legislation, the Uni-
form Relocation Act, was enacted to improve and standardize the assistance the Fair
Compensation Act provided, which consisted of relocation benefits only to persons
displaced by government acquisitions of real property for public purposes. Id. at 1-2,
122, 147-67. See Alexander v. HUD, 411 U.S. at 49-55.
34. 411 U.S. 39 (1979).
35. Id. at 62.
36. 363 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
37. Id. at 671-72.
38. 586 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1978).
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acquisitions by a private developer aided by federal rent subsidies
did not receive relocation assistance due to the Act's definition of
federal financial assistance.39 In Parlane Sportswear Co., Inc. v.
Weinberger," the court found a manufacturer ineligible for reloca-
tion benefits, although the acquiring private university received fed-
eral grants.4 '
Finally, dislocation as a result of acquisitions for a public purpose
by a private agency not receiving federal financial assistance, as in
the Young case, is beyond the scope of the Act. Thus, for two reasons
the Eighth Circuit in Moorer v. HUD42 denied relocation benefits to
residents dislocated by a private developer not receiving federal
financial assistance. First, persons displaced by private acquisitions
of real property, which are aided by federal financial assistance
through mortgage insurance and interest rent subsidies, are not dis-
placed persons because mortgage insurance. and rent subsidies are
specifically excluded under the Act.43 Second, area residents were
not forced to move by a government agency through eminent domain
but by a private entity without such power.' The Uniform Reloca-
tion Act was intended to benefit those forcibly displaced by public
agencies with coercive powers such as eminent domain."5
In Young, the first requirement for relocation assistance, disloca-
tion,4 6 was present because the developer forced the residents to
move. Conflict arose, however, as to whether the residents met the
remaining requirements.4' This conflict required judicial interpreta-
39. Id. at 1140.
40. 381 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), a f'd, 513 F.2d 835 (Ist Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 925 (1975).
41. 381 F. Supp. at 412; 513 F.2d at 836-37.
42. 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
43. 561 F.2d at 179.
44. Id. at 183.
45, Id.
46, Dislocation may occur when a government agency possessing the power of
eminent domain or a non-government entity possessing powers to condemn real prop-
erty uses or threatens to use that power to force a family or individual to vacate a
dwelling unit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976). See notes 1 and 11 supra, and note 66
and accompanying text infra. For a general background on the impact of dislocation,
see Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to Full In-
demnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801, 802 (1969).
47. Appellants argued they were displaced as a result of acquisitions of real prop-
erty by the interdependent efforts of the city as a recipient of federal financial assist-
ance and the urban redevelopment corporation which possessed limited eminent
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tion of "displaced persons" in Section 101(6) of the Uniform Reloca-
tion Act.48
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Chapter 353 corporations,
designed to foster the redevelopment of blighted areas, are neither
federal nor state agencies but rather are private corporations.4 9 Fur-
thermore, even if Chapter 353 corporations were federal or state
agencies, they do not receive the requisite type of federal financial
assistance.50 Since Young residents were dislocated as a result of ac-
quisitions of real property for a public purpose by a private corpora-
tion not receiving federal financial assistance as defined by the
Uniform Relocation Act, the court held the Act was inapplicable."
Therefore, area residents failed to establish a claim upon which the
court could grant injunctive relief. 2
Although the outcome of this case is legally defensible,53 especially
after Alexander,54 the result is unfortunate. The critical issue in
domain power. Brief of Appellents supra, note 7 at 13-15. Appellees, on the other
hand, argued that residents' dislocation was a direct result of deterioration, not rede-
velopment. Furthermore, the urban redevelopment corporation, as the acquiring
agency, did not receive federal financial assistance as required under § 101(6) of the
Uniform Relocation Act. Brief for Appellees Pantheon Corp. and Pershing Redev.
Corp., at 3-11, Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 1979).
49. Missouri urban redevelopment corporations are organized and operated for
profit, Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.030(11) (1978); are subject to federal and state taxes, id.
§ 353.110, and are subject to the general corporations laws of Missouri to the extent
allowed under specific provisions of Chapter 353, id. § 353.070. See note 9 supra, on
the unique character of Chapter 353 corporations. See generally REVIVINO CITIES,
supra note 9.
In 1978 the Missouri legislature enacted the so-called "Sunshine Act" which elimi-
nated confusion over the status of redevelopment corporations by specifically exclud-
ing them from its definition of "public governmental body." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 610.010(2) (1978).
50. See notes 9 supra and 84 infra.
51. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d at 878.
52. The Eighth Circuit considered whether appellants could prove they would
prevail to keep the preliminary injunction from being dissolved. The district court
found that representatives of residents forced to move failed to show they were likely
to succeed on the merits regarding statutory violations. Appellants were not wrongly
displaced because the Uniform Relocation Act did not apply; therefore, they were
ineligible to receive federal relocation benefits. The appellate court agreed, and af-
firmed the district court's denial of appellants' request to enter a preliminary injunc-
tion. 599 F.2d at 879.
53. See notes 32-45 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 4-5 supra.
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Young, whether a Chapter 353 corporation is a government agency
under the Act, received a negative response from the court." The
court focused on the source of capital of Chapter 353 corporations as
the defining characteristic.56 Because Chapter 353 corporations are
financed by capital contributions from stockholders57 and not gov-
ernment grants, the court concluded that these were private corpora-
tions for the purposes of the Uniform Relocation Act.58 The court's
focus is perhaps warranted by the legislative intent of Missouri when
it created Chapter 353 urban redevelopment corporations. The legis-
lation attempted to solicit private help for distressed cities unable to
bear the burden of redevelopment. 59 Nevertheless, the court over-
looked several significant public features of this unique corporate
creature. First, the reason for creating Chapter 353 corporations was
to serve the public purpose of redeveloping blighted urban areas.60
Second, the Chapter 353 corporation is a limited-profit corporation
61
receiving substantial tax abatements.62 Third, and most importantly,
Chapter 353 corporations have broad powers of eminent domain.63
Eminent domain is the power to take property for public purposes
and is an inherent power of the sovereign which can be delegated.'
Missouri, unlike other states, delegates powers of eminent domain
along with tax abatements to Chapter 353 corporations.65 Except for
delegation powers, these corporations effectively have authority com-
parable to a city's in dislocating people. Consequently, government
action indirectly forced Young area residents to relocate.66 If the city
55. See notes 8-9 and 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
56. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 877 (8th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 874.
58. Id. at 877.
59, See REVIVING CITIES, upra note 9 (legislative history of Missouri Chapter
353 corporations).
60. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
61, Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "[no
person shall be. . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." See
MISSOURI BAR, MISSOURI CONDEMNATION PRACTICE §§ 1.1-1.4 (1979).
65. See, REVIVING CITIES, supra note 9.
66. Because urban renewal programs failed to eliminate urban blight, the current
trend is toward redevelopment programs undertaken by private developers subject to
approval of their redevelopment plans by a federal or state agency. See note I supra
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had not entrusted Chapter 353 corporations with the power of emi-
for the reasons why federal urban renewal programs failed. More than a dozen states
have adopted urban redevelopment corporation laws similar to those in Missouri.
See Morrison Interview, supra note 16; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 13; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
67 , §§ 251-94 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
Thousands of people are denied relocation assistance simply because the public
program is not actually undertaken by a federal or state agency but by private rede-
velopers. See Post-Dispatch, supra note 11 at 3A, col. 3. Even where a municipality
receives federal financial assistance, as defined by the Uniform Relocation Act, and
actively participates in the redevelopment process, short of actually acquiring private
property, the Act does not apply. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d at 873-78. Therefore, if a
federal or state agency receiving federal financial assistance undertakes an urban re-
newal program, displaced persons may receive relocation benefits. If, on the other
hand, an urban redevelopment project is undertaken by a private developer not re-
ceiving federal financial assistance, displaced persons are denied relocation benefits,
But the Uniform Relocation Act does not define the term "to undertake" a public
program. Cases indicate that "to undertake" means to acquire real property for a
public purpose by the power of eminent domain. See, e.g., Conway v. Harris, 586
F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1978) (public program undertaken by private developer
acquiring private property); Goolsby v. Blumenthal, 581 F.2d 455, 463 (5th Cir. 1978)
(public program undertaken by city acquiring private property); Parlane Sportswear
Co. v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d 835, 835-37 (Ist Cir. 1975) (public project undertaken by
private university acquiring private property); Tullock v. State Highway Comm'n,
507 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1974) (public program undertaken by state acquiring pri-
vate property).
With this in mind, the court should consider two questions. First, has the city es-
tablished a public purpose? Second, if so, who has the power of eminent domain to
acquire real property in furtherance of the public purpose?
The purported public interest of the city is not in question. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 353.020(2) (1978). The economic interest in implementing a financially feasible re-
development plan is legitimate, and the health-safety interest in removing unsanitary
conditions and reducing crime is compelling. Once the public purpose has been es-
tablished, the means of executing the project is within the eminent domain power of
the municipality.
These interests, however, are not being served. Obviously, if persons are forced to
move from their residences they must go somewhere. The "somewhere" for many of
the Pershing-Waterman displaced residents was more than 30 miles away from the
redevelopment area. The high cost of housing; the shortage of dwelling units avail-
able, especially for single parents with more than two children or with two children of
the opposite sex; the inability to secure bank loans; and the wait on welfare resources
have made the burden of relocation unnecessarily severe. Morrison Interview, supra
note 16. See note 1 supra.
This process of uprooting disproportionate numbers of lower income, elderly and
minority residents is not only detrimental to the victims, but also to the city because
urban blight tends to follow these displaced persons. As a result, many of the same
residents are forced to move again and again as the blight-redevelopment cycle con-
tinues. Morrison Interview, supra note 16. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d at 879-80
(McMillian, J., concurring). See note 1 supra.
Besides the city's interest not being served, dislocation also has racial overtones.
Predominantly poor blacks are being moved out of the redevelopment area into other
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nent domain, potential evictees could hold out for the taken prop-
erty's fair market value to cover relocation costs.67 It is, however,
racially segregated neighborhoods while more affluent whites moving into the rede-
velopment area are the predominate beneficiaries of the project. Certainly the city's
scheme, allegedly designed to benefit the public as a whole, has failed to do so. See
Post-Dispatch, supra note 11, at 3A, Col. 3.
The nghts of residents not to be subjected to racial discrimination in government
redevelopment programs is a right the courts will protect. The plaintiff need not show
that the government action which resulted in racial discrimination was motivated or
intended by the city, but only that there was a discriminatory impact or effect as a
result of such a program. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974). Schwemm, Discriminator, Effect and the Fair Housing
Act, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199 (1978).
Assuming a public purpose, who has the power of eminent domain? Responsibility
for assisting displaced persons arises out of the government's exercise of eminent do-
main in real property acquisitions and its concern for the economic and social welfare
of such persons. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'T
RELATIONS, note 1 and accompanying text supra. It logically follows that if the city
delegated the benefits of the power of eminent domain to Chapter 353 corporations,
the burdens were also delegated, thus shifting the responsibility for assisting displaced
persons to the Chapter 353 corporation.
The fact that an urban redevelopment corporation has received powers of eminent
domain and other privileges does not transform it into a government agency or instru-
mentality See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976). Accord, Zurn v. City of
Chicago. 389 Ill. 114, 120-21. 59 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1945). Cf. Note, The Private Use of
Pubhc Power The Private University and the Power of Eminent Domain, 27 VAND. L.
RLv 681, 681-718 (1974) (expansion of a private university through the use of emi-
nent domain under the federal urban renewal program). But the concern is not with
whether Chapter 353 corporations are transformed into government agencies for all
purposes by the grant of the eminent domain power. The narrow question is whether
these corporations are quasi-government agencies for the purposes of the Uniform
Relocation Act. If the city had acquired the property by the power of eminent do-
main, then transferred the property to the developer, as usually occurs, the strength of
the question diminishes. In the present case, however, the private corporation under-
took a government program to further the government purpose, with broad govern-
ment powers and privileges. Surely these facts are sufficient to classify Chapter 353
corporations as government agencies for purposes of the Uniform Act.
Even if these facts are not wholly persuasive, someone is responsible for assisting
displaced persons when the power of eminent domain is used or can be used. If the
government transferred this responsibility to the Chapter 353 corporation simultane-
ously with the grant of eminent domain power, then the developer should be held
liable to the displaced residents for losses incurred as a direct result of redevelopment
in the blighted area. If the city did not transfer the burden of assisting displaced
residents to the developer, it necessarily reserved that responsibility. Thus, the city
would be liable to those forcibly displaced by community development. For a general
background on the inadequacies of compensation provided to Young-type residents,
see Leary, Jr. & Turner, The Injustice of "Just Compensation" to Fixed Income Recioi-
ents-Does Recent Relocation Legislation Fill the Void?, 48 TEMP. L. Q. 1, 36-40
(1974).
67 Setting aside the issue of the area tenants' property rights, if the redeveloper
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precisely because Chapter 353 corporations possess eminent domain
powers that potential evictees have no leverage, 68 and even if they
did, the value of blighted property is necessarily low.69 Since the
Act's overall objective is to soften the adverse effects of public pro-
grams on forcibly displaced persons by providing some compensa-
tion,7" the denial of benefits based merely on the source of capital of
a Chapter 353 corporation clearly frustrates stated goals of the Uni-
form Relocation Act.
The Young decision is not only questionable on the issue of
whether a Chapter 353 corporation is a government agency for pur-
poses of the Act. It also raises considerable doubt whether residents
were displaced by a government agency receiving federal financial
assistance as defined by the Act. The Young court stated no reason-
ing for community development block grants being given to the city
for general redevelopment and not specifically for the city's real
property acquisitions in the designated redevelopment area.71 Given
4lexander72 and the strict causality test between federal or state ac-
tion and displacement therein outlined,7 3 the court correctly denied
benefits for relocation under the Uniform Act. Practically speaking,
however, federal funds may well assume a key role in eliminating
urban blight whether these funds are used generally or specifically by
the recipient.74 In any event, the evictee does not care whether he
was forcibly displaced by direct or indirect government action,75 by
specific or general federal funding,76 or by a government or quasi-
government corporation,77 because all result in displacement.
had to purchase land from the residents, the property owners could at least bargain
for a price sufficiently high to cover relocation expenses.
68. See note 9 supra.
69. The value of a blighted building may be so low that even if the property own-
er received the fair market value of the property from the government or the devel-
oper, it may be insufficient to cover the relocation costs. Relocation expenses may be
abnormally high for poor, elderly, and minority residents who tend to have difficulty
finding alternative housing. See note 66 supra.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976).
71. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d at 878.
72. Alexander v. HUD, 441 U.S. 39 (1979).
73. Id.
74. See ADRIAN & PRESS, supra note I, at 504-08.
75. See notes 8-9 and 49-52 supra.
76. See note 9 supra.
77. See notes 8-9 and 49 supra.
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The consequences of the Young decision highlight the Uniform
Relocation Act's inherent flaws. Current efforts to reform the Act by
Congress78 and HUD7 9 consider victims displaced for a public pur-
pose by private redevelopment corporations. Successful efforts to aid
persons displaced under a public program performed by a private
entity must address certain problems. First, there is a lack of uni-
formity and adequacy in the distribution of relocation benefits be-
cause these benefits depend on whether a government or private
78 Senator James Sasser (D-Tennessee) proposed amendments to the Uniform
Relocation Act in April 1979 to force private developers with the power of eminent
domain to pay displaced tenants relocation benefits. Under § 101(3), the term "state
agency" is expanded to include any entity which has the power of eminent domain
pursuant to state authority. S. 1108, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979). Thus, a Chapter
353 corporation that delegated the power of eminent domain would be a state agency
under the proposed language. By expanding the list of recipients of federal financial
assistance to include state agencies, Chapter 353 corporations would be state agencies
receiving federal financial assistance under the Act. Id. §§ 2, 9. Also, the Sasser
amendments broaden the definition of "'displaced persons" to include those dislocated
by a program undertaken by a state agent. Id. If the private developer, now defined
as.a state agent, undertakes a government program, it is liable to displaced residents
for relocation benefits under the proposed amended Act.
Additionally. the Sasser proposal would require the President to establish uniform
guidelines for all agencies acquiring real property for public purposes. Id. § 14. The
purpose of this provision is to further the original purpose of the act by providing fair
and more uniform treatment to those displaced as a result of government programs.
See Post-Dispatch, supra note 11.
Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R-Massachusetts) and Rep. Robert F. Drinan (D-Massa-
chusetts) have also introduced legislation extending the Uniform Relocation Act pro-
visions to other federally funded programs such as the Federal Housing
Administration, which receives federal mortgage guarantees and contributes to re-
moval of disadvantaged families. See Gale, Dislocation ofResidents Endangers Neigh-
borhood Conservation Efforts- *hat Solutions are Possible?, 35 J. HOUSING 232
(1978). See generally Problems of Dislocation and Diversity in Communities Undergo-
ing Neighborhood Revitalization Activitr Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 48-54, 94-100 (1977)
(statements of Robert Schur and Carl Westmoreland).
79. In 1978, Patricia Harris, then Secretary of HUD, met with the Task Force of
Relocation and Displacement Policies of the National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials to study the effect of displacement and possible action. The
department's recommendations included the identification of programs and classifica-
tions of persons for which uniform and adequate assistance is not presently available
through the Uniform Relocation Act. See Editorial Staff, Association News, 35 J.
HOUSING 142 (1978).
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entity acquires the real property. 0 Second, dislocated persons are
treated unfairly and inequitably, especially lower-income, predomi-
nately black inner-city residents.8 Last, the Act, designed to benefit
the public as a whole, results in the perpetration rather than preven-
tion of disproportionate injuries to dislocated persons.8" Therefore, if
the scope of the Uniform Relocation Act is not expanded, its declared
purpose will continue to be defeated.
At lease three remedial alternatives are available to Congress.83
These alternatives shift liability for relocation from displaced resi-
dents, who are least able to bear it, to either the private undertaker or
government authorizor of urban redevelopment programs, who are
better able to bear the burden. Congress could redefine "federal
financial assistance" to include federal mortgage insurance and guar-
antees.8 4 A private corporation acquiring real property would
thereby receive federal financial assistance as required under the
Uniform Act, and displaced persons would then be eligible to receive
relocation benefits. Congress could also redefine "displaced persons"
80. See notes 1, 8-9, and 49-52 supra.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The United States Supreme Court and the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have
stated that any extensions of the Act's scope must be left to Congress. See Alexander
v. HUD 441 U.S. 39 (1979); Conway v. Harris, 586 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1978);
Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175, 183 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
84. Section 101(4) provides: "The term "Federal financial assistance" means a
grant, loan, or contribution provided by the United States, except any Federal guar-
antees or insurance and any annual payments or capital loan to the District of Colum-
bia." 42 U.S.C. § 4601(4) (1976).
Since this language expressly excludes private redevelopment corporations receiv-
ing federal mortgage guarantees, private developers, like the one in Young, are not
required to provide relocation assistance. Congress could, however, redefine § 101(4)
as follows: 'The term "Federal financial assistance" means a grant, loan, contribution
provided by the United States, or any Federal guarantees or insurance, except any
annual payment or capital loan to the District of Columbia." (Italicized portion
shows proposed change.) Thus, a private corporation acquiring real property would
receive federal financial assistance as defined in the proposed § 101(6) of the Reloca-
tion Act. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, urban redevelopment
corporations, aided by federal mortgage insurance or guarantees, would bear the bur-
den of relocation. It is doubtful that this burden would be sufficiently great to dis-
courage private developers from continuing to assist metropolitan areas in
eliminating blight because of the numerous privileges and benefits these corporations
enjoy. See note 9 supra. The mandatory payment of relocation benefits would sim-
ply be included as one of the cost of doing business.
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to embrace those displaced by a private agency."- Thus, persons dis-
located by a private developer would meet the eligibility require-
85. See note 31 and accompanying text supra for a complete reading of§ 101(6).
Under this section, a private entity, such as an urban redevelopment corporation, can
acquire real property for a public program resulting in displacement without paying
any relocation assistance to displaced persons. As long as there is a public purpose,
whether the property is actually acquired by a public or private entity should be inci-
dental. A4ccord, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). See generally note 66 and
accompanying text supra.
Congress could eliminate this unnecessary distinction by redefining § 101(6) to
read:
The term "displaced person" means any person who, on or after the effective
date of the Act, moves from real property, as a result of the acquisition of such
real property, in whole or in part, as a result of the written order of the acquiring
agency to vacate real property for a program or project undertaken by a Federal
agency, or a program or project authorized by a Federal agency or by a State
agency receiving Federal financial assistance, regardless of who undertakes such
project, and solely for the purpose of sections 202(a) and (b) and 205 of this title,
as a result of the acquisition of or as the result of the written order of the acquir-
ing agency to vacate other real property, on which such person conducts a busi-
ness or farm operation, for such program or project.
Congress would also need to amend those sections of the Act regarding local coopora-
tion by the state agent with the federal government in achieving the ends of the legis-
lation. Section 207 now reads in part:
Whenever real property is acquired by a State agency and furnished as a re-
quired contribution incident to a Federal program or project, the Federal agency
having authority over the program or project may not accept such property un-
less such State agency has made all payments and provided all assistance and
assurances, as are required of a State agency. . .42 U.S.C. § 4627 (1976). As
amended § 207 would read:
Whenever real property is acquired by orfor a State agency and furnished as a
required contribution incident to a Federal program or project, the Federal
agency having authority over the program or project may not accept such prop-
erty unless such State agency has made all payments and provided all assistance
and assurances, as are required of a State agency. . . .(Italicized portion indi-
cates proposed amendment.)
Also note § 208 which now reads:
Whenever real property is acquired by a State agency at the request of a Fed-
eral agency for a Federal program or project, such acquisition shall, for the pur-
poses of this Act, be deemed an acquisition by the Federal agency having
authority over such program or project.
42 U.S.C. § 4628 (1976). This language should be modified to read:
Whenever real property is acquired by orfor a State agency at the request of a
Federal agency for a Federal program or project, such acquisition shall, for pur-
poses of this Act, be deemed an acquisition by the Federal agency having author-
ity over such program or project. (Emphasis indicates proposed language).
This new language would cover those persons displaced by urban redevelopment cor-
porations; thus, relocation assistance would be available to such persons as required
under § 202(a) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (1976). These revisions would place the
burden of relocation on the federal agency authorizing land acquisitions for public
purposes.
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ments for relocation assistance. Alternatively, Congress could extend
the provision for benefit payments to displaced persons and encom-
pass the federal agency authorizing the acquisitions for public pro-
grams by private entities, rather than limit the payment of benefits to
federal or state agencies undertaking public programs. 6 Then the
Act would require a federal or state agency receiving federal financial
assistance to provide benefits to persons displaced by private redevel-
opment corporations whose plans are approved and adopted by a
federal or state agency.
These alternatives are more consistent with congressional intent in
enacting the Uniform Relocation Act than is the present wording of
the statute. The reforms will remedy the current evils of a lack of
uniformity, inadequacy, unfairness, inequity, and disproportionate
injury. 7 By eliminating differential treatment of persons adversely
86. Section 202(a) reads in part:
Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken
by a Federal agency in any State will result in the displacement of any person on
or after the effective date of this Act, the head of such agency shall make a pay-
ment to any displaced person, upon proper application as approved by such
agency head...
42 U.S.C. § 4622 (1976).
This reading of § 202(a) does not provide for the payment of relocation benefits
unless a federal agency undertakes the actual acquisition. Thus private corporations
undertaking public programs are not required to make relocation payments and
neither is the federal agency receiving federal assistance. This "loophole" in the law
could be closed if § 202(a) were rewritten in part as follows:
Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken
or authorized by a Federal agency in any State will result in the displacement of
any person on or after the effective date of this Act, the head of such agency shall
make a payment to any displaced person, upon application as approved by such
agency head. (Italicized portion shows proposed change.)
This new reading would allow for payment of relocation benefits to displaced
persons even if the acquisition of real property was not undertaken by the federal
agency receiving federal financial assistance. This revision shifts the burden of
liability for relocation from displaced residents to the federal agency authorizing
these acquisitions.
87. See notes 1, 22 and 66 and accompanying text supra.
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affected by real property acquisitions for public programs,88 the pur-
pose of the Uniform Relocation Act is reinstated.89
Debra A4. Buie
8. Id.
89. Under any one of these proposals the number of "displaced persons" ligible
to receive relocation benefits would probably increase as would the need for addi-
tional funds. Perhaps it is impossible to design a comprehensive relocation policy
that addresses the conflicting goals of providing uniform and adequate federal assist-
ance to displaced persons. For a general background on the relative weights of con-
flicting values for public policy alternatives, see T. DYE, UNDErSTANDIno PUBLIC
PoLicy 27-29 (1972). We may be forced to choose between a uniform minimum relo-
cation benefit plan for a large number of displaced persons and an adequate maxi-
mum relocation assistance plan for a small number of dislocated persons.
Socioeconomic tradeoffs like these promote lengthy debate, but perhaps it is better to
implement a relocation policy that is either uniform or adequate than to continue
with our present policy which is neither.
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